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INTRODUCTION
Extradition treaties and other conventional methods of international
cooperation have proven ineffective in the fight against international ter-
rorism and narco-terrorism. Since 1988, the U.S. government has re-
sorted to unilateral measures to bring terrorists and other suspects to
trial in the United States. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
however, recently undermined the government's efforts by refusing to ex-
ercise jurisdiction over suspects not seized in accordance with an asylum
state's wishes. This rule would deal a serious blow to the government's
ability to combat crimes that have remained notoriously impervious to
the current international law enforcement regime.
The 1985 kidnapping, torture, and murder of Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) Special Agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar provides a case
in point. Camarena was kidnapped by members of a Latin American
drug cartel; his mutilated body was found one month after he disap-
peared.1 The murder resulted in political tension between the govern-
ments of the United States and Mexico because of the perception that the
Mexican government had not done enough to bring Camarena's killers to
justice.2 In the face of this lack of progress, the DEA embarked on a
program to bring Camarena's murderers to the United States for trial.
1. The murder and subsequent activities attracted much attention and created tension between
the United States and Mexico, with the United States clamping down on border traffic between the
two countries in an attempt to pressure Mexico to take quick action to resolve the case. See Mexico
Asks US. to Cease Lengthy Border Inspections;, Says Delays Won't Resolve the Problem, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 21, 1985, at 2.
2. See Storm Arises over Camarena; U.S. Wants Harder Line Adopted, LATiN AM. WKLY.
REP., Mar. 8, 1985, at 10 ("DEA head Francis Mullen has charged that the Mexican police deliber-
ately let a key suspect... slip through their fingers. 'Mexico hasn't arrested a major drug trafficker
in eight years,' added an angry Mullen."); see also Mexico's President Comes Calling, 132 CONG.
REC. 11,462 (1986) (statement of Sen. Hawkins):
The thing that rankles me most about Mexico is how it pussyfoots around on the subject of
drug trafficking and corruption in high places. Drug dealers operate with impunity, with-
out the slightest fear that they will be caught. And if they are unlucky enough to be caught
in one of the occasional nets Mexican authorities cast from time to time, nothing ever
happens. They are never prosecuted. They are released with at most a slap on the wrist.
Id.
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Ultimately, a number of suspects were captured, three of them through
irregular methods. Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain and Rene Martin
Verdugo-Urquidez were abducted from Mexico and delivered to the
United States; Juan Ramon Matta-Ballesteros was abducted from
Honduras.3
In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez (Verdugo II)4 and subse-
quently in United States v. Alvarez-Machain,5 the defendants claimed
that the abductions violated the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty. 6 The
Ninth Circuit agreed and held that this violation, combined with Mex-
ico's protest of the abductions, stripped the court of its jurisdiction over
the cases. The court remanded Verdugo II for a determination of the
nature of the U.S. involvement in the abduction, with instructions that if
the abduction had been conducted or authorized by the U.S. government,
then Verdugo-Urquidez was to be repatriated to Mexico. In Alvarez, the
Ninth Circuit also ordered repatriation based on its reasoning in Verdugo
I and the evidence of U.S. involvement. Both decisions were appealed
to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari in Alvarez to decide
whether a person has a right not to be tried in U.S. courts when he is
brought before the court in a manner other than that provided in a valid
extradition treaty.1
3. The circumstances of the abductions differ. Alvarez-Machain was abducted only after ne-
gotiations with the Mexican police over the possibility of an informal extradition, during which the
Mexican police officials demanded $50,000 for their "expenses." The negotiations eventually failed
altogether. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 602-03 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd sub
nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W.
3376 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1992) (No. 91-712). No such negotiations took place before the abduction of
Verdugo-Urquidez. Also, the U.S. government was admittedly involved in the Alvarez-Machain
abduction, while its role in the Verdugo-Urquidez kidnapping is unclear. For a detailed discussion
of the circumstances surrounding the abductions, see Abraham Abramovsky, ExtraterritorialAbduc-
tions7 America's "Catch and Snatch" Policy Run Amok, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 151 (1991).
4. 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991),petition for cert filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3341 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1991)
(No. 91-670) (Verdugo II). In an earlier stage, the same case was appealed to the Supreme Court on
a Fourth Amendment search and seizure issue. U.S. agents had conducted a search of Verdugo-
Urquidez's home in Mexico with the cooperation of Mexican officials, but without a search warrant.
The Ninth Circuit held that the evidence so seized was inadmissible. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to aliens abroad. See United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (Verdugo 1).
5. 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), cert granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3376 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1992) (No.
91-712). The Verdugo 1I case is on hold pending the decision in Alvarez. Certiorari was likely
granted in Alvarez instead of Verdugo 11 because the extent of United States involvement in the
abduction of Alvarez-Machain was clear, while in Verdugo 11 it was not.
6. Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mexico, 31 U.S.T. 5061.
7. The Seventh Circuit denied a similar jurisdictional defense in Matta-Ballesteros's case be-
cause the Honduran government did not protest the abduction. See Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman,
896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 209 (1990); see infra note 116.
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This Note addresses the validity of the jurisdictional defense raised
by the defendants in these two cases.8 Although the law in this area is
admittedly obscure, this Note argues that the Ninth Circuit erred in sev-
eral respects in its reasoning in Verdugo II and Alvarez, and that the
exigencies of international law enforcement justify the availability of ir-
regular means of gaining custody over fugitives in certain limited cases.
The use of such methods is limited to extraordinary cases by the inevita-
ble political and diplomatic repercussions, but in those cases where the
executive concludes that the benefits outweigh the disadvantages, the
courts have no cause to intervene.
Part I briefly traces the development of the prior law and sets forth
the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Verdugo II. Part I concludes that the
court's distinction between the precedents and the facts of Verdugo II is
not valid. Part II addresses the Verdugo II court's opinion that extradi-
tion treaties provide the exclusive means for gaining custody over fugi-
tives abroad, and concludes that the history and purposes of extradition
treaties negate the inference of exclusivity. In Part III, the discussion
shifts to the question of whether, assuming that extradition treaties do
provide the sole means for acquiring custody, individuals should have
standing to claim violations of an extradition treaty as a defense. This
Part concludes that if there is any individual standing at all, it exists only
when the asylum state specifically protests the exercise of jurisdiction by
the abducting state. Finally, Part IV considers the repatriation remedy
ordered by the Ninth Circuit and concludes that repatriation is inappro-
priate. Several other remedies are available to both the abducted fugitive
and the asylum state. This Part argues that these alternative remedies
constitute sufficient disincentives to the widespread use of abduction so
that the decision to employ the "catch and snatch" method is appropri-
ately left to the executive.
8. The Ninth Circuit's reasoning was fully set forth only in Verdugo II; thus, the discussion
will center on that decision. This Note will not discuss the policy considerations that underlie a
decision to resort to irregular means of gaining custody: Such questions are properly resolved by the
executive in the exercise of his foreign policy discretion. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). The wisdom of a "catch and snatch" policy is fertile ground for discus-
sion. See, eg., Abramovsky, supra note 3; Richard Downing, Recent Development, The Domestic
and International Legal Implications of the Abduction of Criminals from Foreign Soil, 26 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 573 (1990). The policy itself is the outgrowth of a 1988 opinion of the Office of the Legal
Counsel of the U.S. Justice Department, written by current Attorney General William Barr. The
1988 opinion is not available to the public. See FBI Authority to Seize Suspects Abroad: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional Rights of the House Comm on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1989) [hereinafter Seizure Hearing] (statement of William Barr). The more
general question of the use of the U.S. military in extraterritorial law enforcement operations is
treated elsewhere in this issue. See Christopher A. Donesa, Note, Protecting National Interests: The
Legal Status of Extraterritorial Law Enforcement by the Military, 41 DUKE L.J. 867 (1992).
Vol. 41:907]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
I. FROM KER TO VERDUGO II: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
PRECEDENT
In an 1886 decision, Ker v. Illinois, the Court established that the
means by which a person comes within the jurisdiction of the court has
no effect on the court's power to try him.9 Ker was abducted from Peru
by a Pinkerton agent who, instead of delivering a request for extradition
to the Peruvian government, acted on his own initiative to abduct Ker
and forcibly return him to the United States for trial. Ker claimed that
he had a right to be removed from Peru only in accordance with the
provisions of the extradition treaty between the United States and Peru
then in force. The Court emphatically rejected the argument, character-
izing Ker's claim as one of a right to asylum. The Court noted that "the
absurdity of such a proposition would at once prevent the making of a
treaty of that kind."' 10
The Ker position was uniformly followed for over six decades and
was reaffirmed by the Court in Frisbie v. Collins." Frisbie involved a
government-authorized abduction of a fugitive from Illinois by Michigan
authorities. The Court in Frisbie noted that it had "never departed from
the rule in Ker... that the power of a court to try a person for crime is
not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's
jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction.' 112 The Ker-Frisbie doc-
trine, as it has come to be known, has been a staple of U.S. jurisprudence
for over 100 years and has emerged relatively unscathed from a series of
attacks.13
In the face of this continued reaffirmation of the principles set forth
in Ker and its progeny, the Verdugo II court decided that an abduction
in lieu of extradition deprived the court of its jurisdiction. The Ninth
Circuit dismissed the government's reliance on the Ker-Frisbie doctrine
by distinguishing both Ker and Frisbie from the facts in Verdugo II. The
Ninth Circuit held that Ker stood only for the proposition that a private
kidnapping did not violate an extradition treaty.14 It relied on dictum in
9. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
10. Id. at 442.
11. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
12. Id. at 522.
13. See, eg., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (rejecting challenge based on due process
grounds); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974) (rejecting challenges based on the
U.N. Charter and Charter of the Organization of American States).
14. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez (Verdugo II), 939 F.2d 1341, 1346 (9th Cir. 1991),
petition for cert filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3341 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1991) (No. 91-670). The accepted view is
otherwise. See, eg., United States ex reL Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975); United
States v. Quesada, 512 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859 (5th Cir.
1974).
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Ford v. United States,15 a case that involved the seizure of a British ship
for violation of U.S. prohibition laws. A treaty with Britain provided
that such seizures could only occur when the ship carrying the liquor was
within one hour's travel from U.S. shores. 16 The defendants argued that
their ship was outside that range, and that therefore the treaty expressly
barred their seizure. The Court declined to reach the issue of whether
the treaty had been violated, holding that it had been waived. The Court
indicated in dictum, however, that the Ker doctrine might not have ap-
plied because, although in Ker the treaty was not at issue, "[h]ere a treaty
of the United States is directly involved, and the question is quite differ-
ent."' 7 This statement, according to the Verdugo II court, illustrated
that the "expansive view" of Ker had not been adopted by the Supreme
Court, despite the Frisbie decision's broad language. 18
The Ninth Circuit dismissed Frisbie as providing "no support for
the broad reading of Ker,"' 9 despite the Frisbie Court's broad affirmation
of Ker. The Verdugo II court based its conclusion on two grounds.
First, it noted that in Frisbie, no extradition treaty was involved. 20 Sec-
ond, the court found that the rule announced in Frisbie was appropriate
15. 273 U.S. 593 (1927).
16. See Convention for Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors, U.S.-Gr. Brit., May
22, 1924, art. II, § 3, 43 Stat. 1761, 1762.
17. Ford, 273 U.S. at 606.
18. See Verdugo II, 939 F.2d at 1346. The court's conclusion is unwarranted. The treaty in-
volved in Ford expressly stated that "[t]he rights conferred by this article shall not be exercised at a
greater distance from the coast of the United States... than can be traversed in one hour." Conven-
tion for Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors, supra note 16, art. II, § 3, 43 Stat. at 1762.
Thus, if the seizure had taken place further away, an express treaty provision would have been
violated. By contrast, there was no such violation of a provision of the U.S.-Mexico Extradition
Treaty. The Verdugo II court argued that the lack of an express treaty violation was irrelevant
because, since international law prohibits a violation of another country's territorial sovereignty,
there was no need for an express exclusivity provision. See Verdugo 11, 939 F.2d at 1352. The court
found that principles of international law are relevant to the interpretation of treaties. Although this
is true, the rules of treaty interpretation establish that primary reference is to be made to the clear
meaning of the words of the treaty and the intent of the parties. Only where ambiguity remains can
recourse be had to other sources of understanding. See 1 M. CHtRIF BAssIouNI, INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 76-80 (2d rev. ed. 1987); Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 31, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
As discussed infra Part II, both the words and the purpose underlying extradition treaties unam-
biguously contradict the theory that extradition is to be the sole method of acquiring custody. The
Verdugo 1/ court wrongly dismissed the primary sources of treaty interpretation in favor of general
principles of international law.
19. Verdugo II, 939 F.2d at 1347.
20. See id. The court ignored that, although there was no extradition treaty, the Constitution
does provide for interstate extradition. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3181-
3195 (1988). The Court never discussed the Extradition Clause in Frisbie, but it should be noted
that the Clause has the same purpose as an extradition treaty, and is akin to a treaty obligation.
Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222 (1906). The Extradition Clause was intended to facilitate
the administration of justice by limiting the rights that the asylum state could confer upon a fugitive:
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only in cases of domestic kidnapping, not international kidnapping. In
international cases, "the remedy is apparent: [the fugitive] must be re-
turned to the custody of the government lodging the protest... [and
then] after he is repatriated, the United States could invoke the extradi-
tion process, and depending on the outcome of that process, might be
able to obtain jurisdiction over him. '21 By contrast, the court argued, in
a domestic case repatriation to another state would create an "intractable
remedial problem" because, by law,22 states must deliver fugitives to
other states upon request.23 The court speculated that this remedial
problem "may have motivated the decision in Frisbie."24
After dismissing the U.S. government's arguments based on the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine, the Verdugo II court held that extradition treaties pro-
vide the exclusive means of acquiring custody over fugitives abroad. It
further held that a failure to use the treaty procedures constituted a
treaty violation that the defendant could raise to bar jurisdiction, pro-
vided that the asylum state protested the violation of its sovereignty.
Part II argues that both of these holdings are inconsistent with the pur-
pose of extradition treaties, which were designed to accommodate inter-
national cooperation in ordinary criminal matters.
II. NON-EXCLUSIVITY OF EXTRADITION TREATIES
The Verdugo II court argued that, by entering into an extradition
treaty, a state renounces all other methods for acquiring custody over
fugitives abroad, in favor of the treaty procedures. 25 The court held that
the detailed procedures set forth in the treaty and the several exceptions
to the duty to extradite set forth in Articles Five, Eight, Nine, and Seven-
teen of the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty made sense only if the treaty
were held to provide the exclusive mechanism.26 This Part argues that
"The purpose of the Clause was to preclude any state from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives from
justice of another state." Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 287 (1978). This parallels the Court's
characterization of extradition treaties in Ker as "restriction[s] upon the right of the government of
the country of the asylum to protect the criminal from removal therefrom." Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S.
436, 443 (1886). Thus, although there was no extradition treaty involved in Frisbie, it is erroneous to
conclude that Frisbie is irrelevant to the facts in Verdugo II.
21. Verdugo II, 939 F.2d at 1347.
22. See 18 U.S.C. § 1382 (1988).
23. See Verdugo II, 939 F.2d at 1347.
24. Id. However, because the rule in Frisbie was merely a reaffirmation of the holding in Ker,
which was an international case, this distinction is improbable. Further, it makes no sense to allow a
fugitive to benefit from the possibility that the asylum state might not have decided to extradite him,
'given the underlying purposes of extradition treaties. See infra Part II(A). Rather, Ker, Frisbie, and
their progeny are directly on point with the facts in Verdugo II.
25. See Verdugo 1I, 939 F.2d at 1355.
26. See id. at 1350-51.
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the history of extradition and the language of the treaty indicate that the
treaty procedures are intended to be one method of judicial assistance,
but are not intended to replace all other means of acquiring custody.
Exclusivity would defeat the purpose of extradition treaties and is not
warranted by the existence of exceptions to the duty to extradite.
A. Exclusivity Would Defeat the Purposes of Extradition Treaties
The development of extradition practice reflects the evolution of in-
ternational cooperation in criminal matters. Generally, there is no inter-
national legal obligation to extradite fugitives.27 Historically, extradition
was a voluntary limit on the sovereign's authority to grant asylum, im-
posed as a matter of comity; sovereigns delivered fugitives to each other
in the hope that such cooperation would preserve the stability of their
own regimes.28 Thus, political offenders were the prime candidates for
extradition; they were the real threats to stability.29 Over time, with the
collapse of monarchies and the rise of more democratic forms of govern-
ment, political offenses took on a new character, and extradition evolved
into its modem form of cooperation in criminal matters.30 The evolution
in the perceived threat to the world order, from political offenses to crim-
inal offenses, is reflected in extradition treaties, 31 which are designed to
assist states in combatting crime by setting forth procedures whereby the
parties agree in advance to refuse to shelter fugitives duly shown to be
wanted by the other state.
The Verdugo II court misunderstood the purposes of extradition
treaties, vacillating between two conceptions. First, the court described
extradition treaties as "principally designed to further the sovereign in-
terests of nations. ' ' 32 Four pages later, it found a second purpose- that
they are a "means of safeguarding the sovereignty of the signatory na-
tions, as well as ensuring the fair treatment of individuals. ' 33 In light of
the development of extradition, both of these statements of purpose are
incorrect. Extradition treaties are designed to protect neither the sover-
eignty of nations nor the rights of individuals; rather, as noted above,
27. 1 BASSIOUNI, supra note 18, at 10.
28. For an excellent discussion of the evolution of the concept of extradition, see id. at 5. The
Ker Court characterized extradition treaties as a "restriction upon the right of the government of the
country of the asylum to protect the criminal from removal therefrom." Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S.
436, 442 (1886).
29. See 1 BASSIOUNI, supra note 18, at 7.
30. Id. at 387; infra text accompanying notes 65-66.
31. The U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, see supra note 6, while reflecting certain specific con-
cerns of the parties, is typical of extradition treaties as a whole, and will be referred to almost exclu-
sively in this discussion.
32. Verdugo II, 939 F.2d at 1346.
33. Id. at 1350.
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they exist solely to assist the states in preventing and punishing crime.
The court's ambivalent and erroneous conception of the nature of extra-
dition led it fundamentally to misinterpret the provisions of the treaty.
As a result of their history and purpose, two different obligations are
imposed by extradition treaties. The sole effect on the asylum state is to
bind it to deliver a suspect upon a proper request.3 4 If the requesting
state fails to comply with the procedures set forth in the treaty, then the
obligation to comply with the request does not arise. The sole obligation
imposed upon the requesting state is that, if it invokes the extradition
treaty, it will try the extradited suspect only for the specific crime
charged.35 An extradition treaty thus does not create a reciprocal agree-
ment to use the process provided in the treaty exclusively; rather, it cre-
ates two unilateral pledges.
By providing a way for a state to precipitate a legal obligation to
comply with an extradition request, the treaty does not become the sole
means for obtaining custody. 36 To illustrate, Article 1 of the U.S.-Mex-
ico treaty provides that "[tlhe Contracting Parties agree to mutually ex-
tradite"3 7 fugitives according to the provisions of the treaty, not that they
agree to mutually demand extradition in accordance with the provisions
of the treaty. A failure by the requesting state to resort to the treaty
procedures thus does not violate the treaty.
The United States might choose not to use the treaty process for a
number of possible reasons. In the Alvarez and Verdugo II cases, for
example, a treaty-based extradition request likely would have been futile
because Article Nine of the treaty exempts nationals of the asylum state
from the duty to extradite.38 In other cases, the United States might fear
that an official extradition request would be futile given the power of
34. United States v. Sobell, 142 F. Supp. 515, 524 ($.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d 520 (2d Cir.
1957); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 475 (1987) ("A state party to an extradition treaty is obligated to comply with the request
of another state party.., to arrest and deliver a person duly shown to be sought by that state.").
35. Sobell, 142 F. Supp. at 524.
36. See, ag., GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION LAW 8 (1991) ("[While extradition
may be the principal means of rendition, it is only one method by which states may provide mutual
assistance in matters of criminal rendition.... The overriding aim should be to prosecute whenever
a crime has been committed.... mhe use of other means will continue and cannot be ignored.");
Alona E. Evans, International Procedures for the Apprehension and Rendition of Fugitive Offenders,
1980 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 274, 276 ("Extradition may be the established method of rendition,
but it is by no means a convenient method, or, indeed, a popular method.").
37. Extradition Treaty, supra note 6, art. 1, 31 U.S.T. at 5061 (emphasis added).
38. See id art. 9, 31 U.S.T. at 5065; infra notes 54-62 and accompanying text (discussing Arti-
cle Nine). In Matta-Ballesteros's case, an extradition request would have failed because the Hondu.
ran Constitution prohibits extradition of nationals. HOND. CONsT. art. 102 ("No Honduran may be
expatriated nor handed over to the authorities of a foreign state."). Thus, the suspects would have
remained in a safe haven, free from prosecution. This type of legal provision is fairly common,
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drug cartels or terrorists and their success in intimidating foreign govern-
ments. Or, the United States might fear that the same intimidation
would prevent the suspects from receiving a full trial on the charges
against them in the asylum state.39
Whatever the reasoning, the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty did not
obligate the U.S. government to request extradition in accordance with
the treaty procedures; informal methods were available.4° Analogizing
from contract law, the Verdugo I/ court characterized such informal
agreements as "waivers" of the asylum state's right to insist on strict
compliance with the treaty procedures.41 However, given the history of
extradition as a voluntary limitation on the right to grant asylum, such
informal agreements are consistent with the comity-based voluntary ac-
tions by foreign sovereigns to deny asylum that existed prior to the devel-
opment of modem extradition law, and that continue to govern in the
absence of treaties.
Analogous support for nonexclusivity comes from the Supreme
Court's decision in Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. U.S. Dis-
trict Court,42 in which the Court concluded that the mechanisms for col-
lecting evidence provided in the Hague Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters43 were not exclusive of
those provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.44 The Court
relied upon both the language of the Convention and the goals it was
especially among civil law countries; the United States, Great Britain, and other common law coun-
tries typically do not exclude their nationals from the duty to extradite. GILBERT, supra note 36, at
95. This exemption of nationals has been justifiably criticized as creating de facto immunity for
nationals who commit crimes against foreign interests. See, eg., id. at 96-97 (noting the inappropri-
ateness of such policies in light of increasingly porous national borders and the proliferation of
serious international crimes). This sort of provision may explain why the United States first at-
tempted negotiations for an informal extradition of Alvarez-Machain. See supra note 3.
39. These fears might be legitimately based upon the example of the assassinations of members
of the Colombian judiciary by drug lords trying to avoid trial. See, e-g., Ken Dermota, Colombia
Gets Plan to Protect Its Judges, WASH. TIMEs, Nov. 21, 1990, at A7 (noting 250 judges killed by
traffickers and 84% of cases dropped because of bribes or intimidation). The problem is not limited
to Latin America, but extends even to supposedly more stable allies. See, eg., James M. Markham,
Now It's Chirac Who Decides He Can Deal for Hostages, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 6, 1987, at D2 (discuss-
ing France's "unsavory reputation" for refusing to extradite or try terrorists); Jennifer Parmelee,
Italy, U.S. Denounce Release of Suspect; Arab Wanted for Terrorism Freed by Greece, WASH. POST,
Dec. 10, 1988, at A17.
40. There are several informal extradition mechanisms, including deportation, use of immigra-
tion procedures, and voluntary delivery in response to a non-treaty-based request. See I BAssIOUNi,
supra note 18, at 147-246 (discussing various alternatives to treaty-based extradition).
41. See Verdugo II, 939 F.2d at 1352.
42. 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
43. Opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555 [hereinafter Hague Evidence
Convention].
44. See Socidtd Nationale, 482 U.S. at 541.
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designed to achieve in reaching its conclusion. The Court examined the
language of the Convention's preamble, noting that the goal of the Con-
vention was "to facilitate" the collection of evidence and to "improve
mutual judicial co-operation. 45 The Court noted that "[t]he preamble
does not speak in mandatory terms which would purport to describe the
procedures for all permissible transnational discovery and exclude all
other existing practices." 46 According to the Court, interpreting the
Convention as exclusive would undermine its goals by "effectively sub-
ject[ing] every American court ... to the internal laws of [a foreign]
state,"4 7 by making American proceedings contingent on the actions or
inactions of foreign judicial authorities.
Based on the language and goals of the Convention, the Court dis-
missed as inconsistent the two contentions that the Hague Evidence Con-
vention was either the exclusive means of obtaining evidence abroad, or a
required first resort before using the discovery rules of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. The Court concluded that the Convention provided
optional procedures that are "available whenever they will facilitate the
gathering of evidence ... [and] is one method of seeking evidence that a
court may elect to employ," 48 whenever it was appropriate, taking into
consideration the interests of the parties before it as well as those of the
foreign state.49 The parallels between the Hague Evidence Convention
and extradition treaties are evident, and a similar interpretation should
be adopted for the treaties.
Just as the goal of the Hague Evidence Convention was to facilitate
the collection of evidence by providing agreed-upon procedures to sup-
plement the haphazard system that existed before, the U.S.-Mexico Ex-
tradition Treaty set up procedures to allow the states to "cooperate more
closely in the fight against crime and, to this end, to mutually render
better assistance in matters of extradition."' 50 The treaty was established
to supplement the unreliable pre-existing informal procedures. Neither
the Hague Evidence Convention nor the extradition treaty speak in
mandatory terms. Further, if the extradition treaty is held to provide the
45. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 43, pmbl., 23 U.S.T. at 2557.
46. Socidid Nationale, 482 U.S. at 534. Compare the language of the Hague Convention on
Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters, Nov. 15,
1965, art. 1, 20 U.S.T. 361 [hereinafter Hague Service Convention] ("The present Convention shall
apply in all cases ...where there is occasion to transmit a judicial ...document for service
abroad."). The Hague Service Convention has been held to be exclusive. See Volkswagenwerk AG
v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
47. Socidtd Nationale, 482 U.S. at 539.
48. Id. at 541.
49. See id at 533, 546.
50. Extradition Treaty, supra note 6, pmbl., 31 U.S.T. at 5061.
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exclusive mechanism for acquiring custody over a fugitive, U.S. criminal
proceedings would be held hostage to the internal law of foreign states,
thus frustrating the goals of the treaty. Not only could a citizen of a
foreign state automatically find a safe haven at home when domestic law
prohibits extradition of nationals, but the foreign state could simply de-
cide not to extradite, in violation of its treaty obligations. Such a viola-
tion would, of course, make the foreign state liable in international law,
but the remedies in such a case would be purely diplomatic and would
not address the criminal liability of the sought-after individual.
The significance of the Court's interpretation of the Hague Evidence
Convention in Socitd Nationale and its relevance to the interpretation of
extradition treaties become especially clear when it is recognized that,
although attorneys typically conduct discovery on their own in the
United States, in civil law countries the collection of evidence is a judicial
function carried out by the court.51 Thus, if a U.S. court authorized the
use of the procedures of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to collect
evidence abroad, it would be committing an affront to that nation's sov-
ereignty. Despite this fact, the Court in Socidt6 Nationale found that the
courts must weigh the interests of American justice against the interests
of the foreign state.52
A similar approach should be adopted for extradition. To interpret
the treaty as constraining the parties to the exclusive use of the treaty
mechanism in lieu of other existing methods of obtaining custody would
convert the treaty from a crime-fighting device into a straitjacket for law
enforcement agencies. Exclusivity would open up the law enforcement
arena to political and diplomatic forces that would undermine the effi-
ciency of the fight against crime. Given the political and diplomatic
complexities of the extradition process in extremely sensitive cases, the
U.S. government must be permitted to conduct a balancing test such as
that adopted in Socidtd Nationale to determine whether the interests of
justice outweigh the possible diplomatic repercussions of an irregular ac-
quisition of custody.
B. Exceptions to the Duty to Extradite Do Not Warrant an Inference
of Exclusivity
Because there was no textual support for the Ninth Circuit's infer-
ence of exclusivity, the court drew its conclusion from Articles Five,
Eight, Nine, and Seventeen of the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, each
51. Socitd Nationale, 482 U.S. at 543.
52. See id. at 543-44.
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of which contains an exemption from the asylum state's duty to extra-
dite. The court decided that these exceptions made no sense unless the
treaty were intended to be exclusive.5 3
The Verdugo II court began its analysis of the exceptions with Arti-
cle Nine of the Treaty, which exempts nationals of the asylum state from
mandatory extradition, even where the requesting state complies with the
treaty procedures.5 4 According to the court,
[t]he manifest purpose of Article Nine is to preserve each nation's right
not to have its own nationals tried in the courts of the other without its
consent.... It cannot seriously be maintained that Mexico (or the
United States) only wished to preserve the right not to have its citizens
formally extradited. 55
The court thus views Article Nine as a protection of the asylum state's
sovereignty.
In fact, there is no such right of a state not to have its nationals tried
in the courts of another state without its consent. For example, if
Verdugo-Urquidez had been captured in the United States, then Mexico
would have had no cause to protest. States clearly have jurisdiction to
try individuals found within their territory for crimes over which they
have subject-matter jurisdiction.5 6 Similarly, if Verdugo-Urquidez had
been extradited from a third country or captured on the high seas,5 7 then
the state of nationality would not have had cause to protest.
Viewed in the context of the goal of international cooperation in
criminal matters, Article Nine makes sense as an exception to the extra-
dition obligation designed to avoid a conflict between Mexico's treaty
obligation and its domestic law.5 8 The exemption acknowledges that
Mexican law does not permit extradition of nationals, and is included in
the Treaty not as part of any "right" of each nation, but to avoid the
possibility that use of the extradition procedures will force the asylum
state to violate its own domestic law.5 9 The wording of the exception
53. See Verdugo II, 939 F.2d at 1350.
54. Article Nine provides:
1. Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to deliver up its own nationals, but the
executive authority of the requested Party shall, if not prevented by the laws of that Party,
have the power to deliver them up if, in its discretion, it be deemed proper to do so.
2. If extradition is not granted pursuant to paragraph I of the Article, the requested
Party shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution,
provided that Party has jurisdiction over the offense.
Extradition Treaty, supra note 6, art. 9, 31 U.S.T. at 5065.
55. Verdugo I1, 939 F.2d at 1350.
56. Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1822).
57. See United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
58. Ley de Extradicion Internacional, Diario Oficial de la Federacidn Mexicana (Dec. 29, 1975).
59. S. EXEC. REP. No. 21, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979) (letter of submittal). Treaties are
tailored to the realities of the domestic law of the particular states. To illustrate, extradition treaties
with states that do not have such constitutional or statutory prohibitions, such as Canada and the
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supports this reading; the executive has discretion, "if not prevented by
domestic law," 6 to deliver its own nationals. This language envisions the
possibility that the Mexican law will be repealed someday as a step to-
ward greater cooperation between states.
Until such cooperation is achieved, the United States has no choice
but to accept such exceptions in order to gain some sort of international
cooperation. 61 The United States correctly views such domestic law pro-
visions as equivalent to a grant of immunity by states to its nationals for
crimes against other states' interests.62 Such a de facto grant of immu-
nity to nationals undermines the stated goal of extradition treaties to fa-
cilitate cooperation in the fight against crime. The fact that a particular
treaty exempts nationals from extradition does not justify the conclusion
that the treaty is intended to be exclusive of other means of rendition; it
merely reflects the imperfect state of cooperation in international crimi-
nal affairs.
The Verdugo 11 court next focused on Article Five, which provides
that "[e]xtradition shall not be granted when the offense for which it is
requested is political or of a political character... [or] a purely military
offense."'63 The court concluded that this exception also compelled the
inference that the treaty mechanism is exclusive. 64 The court merely pre-
sumed this, without discussing the foundations of the exception, based on
its view that extradition is designed to protect state sovereignty and indi-
vidual rights. The history of the exception belies this conclusion.
The political offense exception only developed in the nineteenth cen-
tury, with the rise of democratic governments.65 The Ninth Circuit itself
has held that the exception reflects an appreciation of the right of indi-
viduals to engage in political activism without fear of retribution, a con-
cern that unsuccessful political activists not be returned to face unfair
punishment on the basis of their political opinions, and the idea that gov-
ernments should not interfere in the internal political affairs of other
states.
66
United Kingdom, do not have exemptions comparable to Article Nine. See, eg., Extradition Treaty,
June 28 & July 9, 1974, U.S.-Can., 27 U.S.T. 983; Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., 28
U.S.T. 227; see also Extradition Treaty, Dec. 10, 1962, U.S.-Isr., art. IV, 14 U.S.T. 1707 (specifically
repudiating the exemption for nationals).
60. Extradition Treaty, supra note 6, art. 9, 31 U.S.T. at 5065 (emphasis added).
61. See infra text accompanying note 75.
62. See 4 MICHAEL A. ABBELL & BRUNO A. RiSTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSIST-
ANCE: CRIMINAL 67 (1990); supra note 38.
63. Extradition Treaty, supra note 6, art 5, 31 U.S.T. at 5063-64.
64. See Verdugo II, 939 F.2d at 1350.
65. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
66. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 793 (9th Cir. 1986).
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The exception recognizes that an asylum state should not be re-
quired either to violate its international legal obligations by refusing to
extradite one charged with a "political" offense or to surrender a person
who is wanted for an "offense" that is not an offense in the asylum state.
For example, if South Africa requested extradition of Nelson Mandela
from the United States for the "offense" of fighting against apartheid, the
United States need not comply. The exception is a manifestation of one
of the basic foundations of extradition law- the double criminality re-
quirement- which requires that acts must be criminal both in the asy-
lum state and the requesting state to fall within the duty to extradite.67
Viewed this way, the political offense exception reflects the fact that the
goal of extradition is cooperation in criminal affairs.
The Ninth Circuit similarly misinterpreted Article Eight's exception
for crimes punishable by death where that crime would not be punishable
by death in the asylum state.68 Article Eight provides perhaps the
strongest example of an exception designed to benefit the individual.
However, the exception must be viewed in the larger context of criminal
cooperation. Although states agree to cooperate in the capture and pun-
ishment of criminals, they only agree to do so where the punishment will
fit the crime. If the death penalty is not available in the asylum state,
then that state cannot be required to extradite. Whereas the double
criminality requirement specifies a certain minimum punishment for a
crime necessary to trigger the extradition duty, the death penalty excep-
tion is an upper limit. Otherwise, criminal cooperation would blur into
cooperation in repression. Article Eight reflects a narrow exception to
criminal cooperation that serves the same purpose as the double crimi-
nality requirement. It does not support a finding of exclusivity.
Finally, the Verdugo II court relied on the rule of specialty embod-
ied in Article 17 of the treaty to support its conclusion of exclusivity.
Article 17 provides that "[a] person extradited under the present Treaty
shall not be detained, tried or punished.., for an offense other than that
for which extradition has been granted nor be extradited by that Party to
67. 1 BASSIOUNI, supra note 18, at 325. The development of the double criminality require-
ment reflects the desire to minimize the technical demands of extradition, and to remove technicali-
ties as defenses to extradition. Cf id at 325-34. Typically, the treaties provide that extradition shall
be granted for crimes for which the maximum punishment in each country is not less than one year
imprisonment. See, eg., Extradition Treaty, supra note 6, art. 2, 31 U.S.T. at 5062.
68. See Extradition Treaty, supra note 6, art. 8, 31 U.S.T. at 5065 ("When the offense ... is
punishable by death under the laws of the requesting Party and the laws of the requested Party do
not permit such punishment for that offense, extradition may be refused . . . ."). Extradition is
discretionary under this Article; there is no right of the individual not to be extradited.
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a third State" unless, among other requirements, the asylum state con-
sents to such actions.69 Again, the court misinterpreted the treaty be-
cause of its flawed understanding of the treaty's purpose. The court here
interpreted the treaty as a protection of the individual. The first problem
with the court's interpretation of Article 17 is that the exception does not
provide that the specialty rule applies to persons "extradited according to
the terms of the treaty,"' 70 but rather to persons "extradited under the
present Treaty."'71 Thus, if a person is not extradited at all, for example
if he is captured in the United States or delivered through an informal
rendition procedure, the specialty doctrine does not apply at all.
The second problem is that the provision must be seen in the context
of the stated purpose of the treaty: to render mutual assistance in crimi-
nal matters. Observed in this context, the specialty rule furthers the goal
of mutual assistance. The rule is designed to ensure that a state not be
able to trigger the treaty obligation to extradite for one offense only to try
the person for a completely different offense that would not have trig-
gered the duty.72 For example, if the United States requested extradition
of a suspect on the ground of murder and then tried the person for the
"crime" of organizing a third political party, then the duty to extradite
would have been abused to overcome the political offense exception. Just
as in the case of the political offense exception and the double criminality
requirement, the specialty doctrine ensures that the states are actually
cooperating in criminal matters, and not abusing the process to further
other interests.
The Verdugo II court's reliance on the exceptions to the extradition
duty to infer exclusivity was inappropriate. In Socidtd Nationale, the
Supreme Court explicitly refused to infer exclusivity from the language
of the Hague Evidence Convention: "In the absence of explicit textual
support, we are unable to accept the hypothesis that the.., contracting
states abjured recourse to all pre-existing... procedures at the same time
that they accepted the possibility that a contracting party could unilater-
ally abrogate even the Convention's procedures." 73 The Supreme
Court's reasoning in Socijtd Nationale suggests that if the United States
and Mexico had intended to impose mutual obligations to follow the pro-
cedures set forth in the treaty, they could have merely added an explicit
statement to that effect.
69. Id. art. 17, 31 U.S.T. at 5071.
70. Verdugo II, 939 F.2d at 1351 (emphasis added).
71. Extradition Treaty, supra note 6, art. 17, 31 U.S.T. at 5071 (emphasis added).
72. This was the case in United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886), which established the
specialty rule. See infra note 77.
73. Soci&6t Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. U.S. District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 537 (1987).
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After considering all of the exceptions to the extradition duty, the
Verdugo II court protested that "[i]t would elevate form over substance
to hold that this protection of each sovereign nation's right to insist on
strict compliance with the treaty may be circumvented if the other party
simply chooses not to invoke the treaty at all." 74 The Verdugo II court's
misunderstanding of the treaty as creating "rights" of the states, other
than the right to demand extradition in response to a treaty-based re-
quest, forced the court to infer exclusivity to make sense of the treaty
provisions. Thus, the court concluded, a failure to utilize the treaty pro-
cedures constituted a violation of the treaty. When placed in the context
of the history and purposes of extradition, the inference of exclusivity is
unjustified. To the extent that the goal of mutual assistance in fighting
crime is furthered by requesting extradition, in accordance with the
treaty, then the requesting state can require the asylum state to extradite.
If that goal is not best served by requesting extradition, then the request-
ing state is not obligated to do so. The only legal consequence of a failure
to use the treaty procedures is that the asylum state is not obligated to
extradite the fugitive.
If the Verdugo II court's interpretation stands, an unfortunate
anomaly will result. Extradition, like many other types of international
judicial assistance, depends on reciprocity between states. The United
States cannot legally extradite a person in the absence of a treaty.75 Its
inability to reciprocate will prevent other states from agreeing to extra-
dite fugitives to the United States. To prevent this deterioration of inter-
national cooperation, therefore, the United States must enter into
extradition treaties. Yet according to the Verdugo I1 court, by doing so
the United States constrains itself to the exclusive use of those treaty
procedures. On the one hand, the United States will have absolute free-
dom, from the viewpoint of American courts, absent a treaty, to capture
fugitives abroad in whatever manner it deems most desirable. On the
other hand, if the United States wants to use less diplomatically volatile
methods such as extradition, then it must give up that freedom.
Instead of contributing to the ability of the United States to punish
criminals, the Verdugo II court's vision of extradition treaties will inter-
fere with law enforcement. The United States has entered into extradi-
tion treaties to help punish criminals. It makes little sense to reward the
individuals in these cases by holding that, by entering into the treaties,
the United States has ironically granted them a safe haven. The Verdugo
/1 court's conception of extradition treaties thus undermines the very
74. Verdugo II, 939 F.2d at 1351.
75. 18 U.S.C. § 1381 (1988); see also Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933).
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goals they are designed to achieve. Extradition treaties were designed
with common criminals in mind. They cannot adequately accomplish
their goal in the context of terrorism and other sensitive crimes. 76 In this
context, the executive must be permitted the discretion to weigh the vari-
ous alternatives and decide which is best in a particular case.
III. INDIVIDUAL STANDING TO RAISE VIOLATIONS OF AN
EXTRADITION TREATY
After arguing that extradition treaties provide the exclusive method
of acquiring jurisdiction over a fugitive abroad, the Verdugo II court ad-
dressed the question of whether the individual abducted in violation of
the treaty could raise that violation as a defense. The court discussed the
U.S. government's contention that any such violation was a purely diplo-
matic issue, but dismissed it based on the holding in United States v.
Rauscher77 that an individual has standing to raise a violation of a spe-
cialty doctrine.78
This Part argues that the Verdugo II court was wrong in conferring
individual standing to raise a violation of an extradition treaty, and that
it compounded this error by not requiring that the asylum state explicitly
demand that the United States repatriate the fugitive. Part III concludes
that if there is individual standing to raise a violation of an extradition
treaty, it exists only when the asylum state explicitly protests the exercise
of jurisdiction over the defendant and demands his repatriation. Thus,
the court still should have exercised jurisdiction over Verdugo-Urquidez.
A. Extradition Treaties Do Not Confer Standing on Individuals
International law, both customary and treaty-based, originated as a
way for sovereign nations to order their relationships with each other.
76. The political and diplomatic difficulties are most obvious in terrorism cases. The extradi-
tion process works quite well in the case of average criminals. For example, from 1978 to 1987,
foreign extraditions grew from 72 to 572, an increase of nearly 800%. Department of Justice Over-
sight Hearing, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1988).
Irregular methods are reserved for the most reprehensible and diplomatically problematic criminals,
which weighs against any danger that upholding jurisdiction will unleash a wave of abductions. See
infra Part IV.
77. 119 U.S. 407 (1886). Rauscher was handed down on the same day as Ker, and involved the
extradition of a defendant from Britain on charges of murder. The United States subsequently
sought to try him on charges of cruel and unusual punishment of his victim. Britain protested, and
the Court held that Rauscher could not be tried for any offense other than that for which he was
extradited. Rauscher established the rule of specialty, which limits the crimes for which an extra-
dited fugitive can be tried without the consent of the asylum state. The rule of specialty is explicitly
stated in most modem extradition treaties. See, eg., Extradition Treaty, supra note 6, art. 17, 31
U.S.T. at 5071. The specialty doctrine is discussed supra at text accompanying notes 69-72.
78. See Verdugo II, 939 F.2d at 1355.
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This "peculiar nation-to-nation" 79 quality typically prevents individuals
from asserting international legal rights. The individual must instead
"repair to the executive authorities of his own state to persuade them to
champion his claim in diplomacy or before an international tribunal."'80
The traditional view is that states have the sole prerogative to decide
whether and how to pursue the complaints of their citizens, and that
citizens do not have standing to pursue their complaints on their own.
In contrast to general customary international law, a treaty can con-
fer standing on individuals if the parties so intend.81 The Verdugo I
court concluded that an extradition treaty did confer individual standing,
viewing the problem of an alleged violation of the extradition treaty as
analogous to a violation of the specialty doctrine. Drawing upon the case
of United States v. Rauscher,82 the court noted that the primary method
for enforcing the specialty doctrine is through a challenge brought by the
individual. 83 By implication, the court reasoned, an individual must
have standing to raise a violation of the extradition treaty as a whole,
despite the lack of an express treaty provision so providing.
The Verdugo 11 court claimed that, because the specialty rule pro-
hibits the trying of an extradited person for a crime other than that for
which he was extradited, "[ilt follows a fortiori ... that, if an individual
79. Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 422 (1964).
80. 'di at 423; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 713 cmt. a (1987) ("In principle, the responsibility of a state... is to the state of
the alien's nationality and gives that state a claim against the offending state. The claim derives from
injury to an individual, but once espoused it is the state's claim, and can be waived by the state.").
81. See, eg., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Human Rights Convention]. The European
Human Rights Convention can be directly relied upon by individuals in suits against governments.
See, eg., Lawless Case, 1961 Eur. Ct. Human Rights, Ser. A. no. 1. In contrast to extradition
treaties, the European Human Rights Convention does not allow a state to waive the human rights
of its nationals. See European Human Rights Convention, supra, art. 17, 213 U.N.T.S. at 234.
82. 119 U.S. 407 (1886). For the facts in Rauscher, see supra note 77.
83. Verdugo 1I, 939 F.2d at 1355. The circuits are split on the procedure for such a challenge.
The Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits require a protest by the asylum state before a specialty viola-
tion can be raised to bar prosecution; lack of a protest implies a waiver of any objections. Id. at n.13.
See Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884 (1973); United States
v. Kaufman, 874 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1989); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986). By contrast, the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits permit an
extraditee to raise specialty violations even absent a protest by the asylum state; an express waiver of
any objection by the asylum state is required to allow such a prosecution to go forward. See
Leighnor v. Turner, 884 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989); United States v. Diwan, 864 F.2d 715 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 492 U.S. 921 (1989). In any event, the consequence of a specialty violation is a refusal to
exercise jurisdiction only with regard to crimes other than those forming the basis for the extradi-
tion. The courts will still exercise jurisdiction for the crimes for which the person was extradited. A
violation of the specialty doctrine does not require repatriation of the fugitive.
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has been kidnapped by a treaty signatory-i.e., if he has not been extra-
dited for any offense at all-he may not be detained, tried, or punished
for any offense without the consent of the nation from which he was
abducted. '84 This extrapolation reflects the Verdugo 11 court's erroneous
conception of the purpose of extradition treaties as a "means of safe-
guarding the sovereignty of the signatory nations, as well as of ensuring
fair treatment of individuals. ' 85 The court concluded from the individ-
ual's enforcement of the specialty doctrine that the individual had stand-
ing to raise a violation of the treaty as a whole.
However, the mere fact that an individual has a right to enforce the
specialty doctrine does not mean that the treaty is intended to confer
standing upon him. Instead, the fact that the individual only has the
right to raise the issue of a treaty violation, as opposed to the right to
insist on a particular outcome, indicates that the real center of interest is
the asylum state: Extradition treaties, including their various "restric-
tions, limitations, or defenses... are not ... primarily designed for the
benefit of individuals. Instead, they are designed to inure to the benefit of
the states involved."'8 6 The specialty enforcement mechanism reflects the
idea that, because the person might not have been extradited for other
crimes, he is present before the court only for the purpose of being tried
for the crimes for which he was extradited. 87 The courts allow the indi-
vidual to raise the specialty violation because otherwise the asylum state
could be deceived into extraditing a fugitive for a crime for which the
asylum state would not have ordinarily extradited him.
In contracting away some of their discretionary right to grant asy-
lum, the parties to a treaty do no more than specify procedures for deter-
mining whether to deny asylum in a particular case. These procedures
are designed to ensure that a state's agreement not to exercise its right to
grant asylum is well-founded. The specialty doctrine, like the double
criminality requirement and the political offense exception, is designed
not to protect the individual, but, in keeping with the nation-to-nation
character of international law, to protect the integrity of the asylum
state's decision to extradite. 88 Failure to comply with the treaty obliga-
tions therefore does not confer any rights upon which the individual can
insist, except when the domestic law of the requesting state permits it.89
84. Verdugo II, 939 F.2d at 1355.
85. Id. at 1350.
86. 2 BASSIOUNI, supra note 18, at 629.
87. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886); 4 ABBELL & RISTAU, supra note 62, at
333.
88. See 1 BAssIOUNI, supra note 18, at 360; supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing how the various extradition limitations protect the integrity of the extradition decision).
89. 2 BASSioUNI, supra note 18, at 630.
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By interpreting the specialty doctrine to mean that an individual who is
not extradited cannot be tried for any crime at all, the court skewed es-
tablished law on the rights of individuals in international law. Extradi-
tion treaties must be read to further their stated goal of cooperating in
the efficient fight against crime.90 By allowing the defendants to raise the
violation of the extradition treaty as a defense, the Verdugo II court
again undermined the purpose of the treaty.
B. Any Individual Standing Must Depend on an Adequate Protest by
the Asylum State
After deciding that an individual might have standing to raise a vio-
lation of an extradition treaty as a defense, the Verdugo II court held that
the asylum state's protest of the abduction was critical to the existence of
standing.91
90. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 31,
8 I.L.M. 679 ("A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.").
91. The court noted that no case had ever addressed the issue of whether an abduction com-
bined with a protest by the asylum state would constitute a violation of an extradition treaty that
could be raised by the individual. See Verdugo II, 939 F.2d at 1346. According to the Verdugo II
court, however, several cases "suggested" that there would be a violation that would confer standing.
See id at 1346, 1349 n.9. The court cited Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 209 (1990); United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32 (lst Cir. 1981); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981);
United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1980); and Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203 (3d Cir.
1975) as supporting this proposition. For example, the court in Reed stated that "absent protest or
objection by the offended sovereign, Reed has no standing to raise a violation of international law as
an issue." Reed, 639 F.2d at 902 (citing United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.
1975)). The Lujan court, however, was referring not to petitioner's claim of a violation of the extra-
dition treaty, but to his claims of violations of the U.N. Charter and the Charter of the Organization
of American States. See Lujan, 510 F.2d at 67. On the issue of a violation of the extradition treaty,
by contrast, the Lujan court referred to United States v. Sobell, 244 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1957), which
held that an abduction did not violate an extradition treaty. See Lujan, 510 F.2d at 66; see also
Sobell, 244 F.2d at 524. The Reed court thus misunderstood Lujan. Lujan stands only for the
proposition that where the plaintiff claims a violation of general international law, the asylum state
must protest to confer standing upon the individual. With regard to extradition treaties, Lujan
specifically held that an abduction did not constitute a violation; thus the issue of a protest was
irrelevant. Therefore, the Verdugo II court's reliance on Reed for support of its proposition that an
abduction combined with a protest constituted a violation of the extradition treaty conferring stand-
ing was misplaced.
In fact, two courts have directly addressed the effect on the court's jurisdiction of a protest in
combination with a violation of an extradition treaty. Both have found that the protest had no effect
upon jurisdiction. In Government of Jamaica v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 627 (M.D. Fla. 1991),
the Jamaican government complied with an extradition request by the United States, only to dis-
cover after rendition that the defendant's notice of intent to appeal the extradition order had been
placed in the wrong file. Jamaica filed an official protest, alleging that the extradition was illegal
under Jamaican law because it occurred before the appeal of the extradition decision, and thus vio-
lated Article 8 of the U.S.-Jamaica Extradition Treaty, which required that extradition be carried
out in conformance with the domestic laws of the parties. Id. at 630 n.5. Jamaica demanded the
EXTRA TERRITORIAL ABDUCTION
The most serious problem with the court's protest requirement is
that it apparently sets no minimum threshold for the type of protest that
will strip the courts of jurisdiction.92 The disparate responses of the
Mexican government to the abductions of Alvarez-Machain and
Verdugo-Urquidez illustrate the problem. In Alvarez-Machain's case,
Mexico immediately and emphatically protested the abduction and de-
manded his return for trial in Mexican courts. 93 The court noted that
several specific formal diplomatic protests had been made, that Mexico
had unequivocally claimed that the abduction had violated the extradi-
tion treaty, and had "at all times demanded his immediate repatriation to
Mexico."' 94 The Alvarez court distinguished the Mexican protest from
that in Verdugo 11.95 In Verdugo-Urquidez's case, Mexico's response
was more ambiguous. Mexico lodged a "formal complaint regarding the
kidnapping" three months after the abduction, and requested that "U.S.
judicial authorities" be notified of the complaint.96
Despite the qualitative difference in the Mexican response in each
case, the Verdugo II court stated that the "clear purpose of the letter [in
Verdugo-Urquidez's case] was to call the court's attention to the Treaty
violation and the court's resulting lack of personal jurisdiction over
Verdugo and to provide the requisite foundation for proceedings leading
defendant's repatriation. The court held that, despite the violation of the extradition treaty and the
Jamaican government's demand, the only remedy was through the diplomatic process. See id. at
633. In an older case, Ex parte Lopez, 6 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Tex. 1934), the petitioner claimed he
had been abducted from Mexico in violation of the extradition treaty. The Mexican government
intervened in the case, raising the same claims as petitioner, and requesting that he be returned to
Mexico, whereupon Mexico would entertain an extradition request. Id. at 343. The court held that,
although the Mexican government's intervention raised serious questions, those questions were prop-
erly left to the executive branch to resolve, and the courts had no jurisdiction to entertain them. Id.
at 344.
92. A further problem is that the Ninth Circuit was inconsistent in its application of the rule it
created. After discussing the split between the circuits as to whether a protest is required to permit
the individual to raise the specialty violation, see supra note 83, the court adopted the approach of
the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, holding that, although the Ninth Circuit does not require a
protest to raise a specialty violation, in the case of a kidnapping, there must be a formal protest from
the asylum state's government. Verdugo II, 939 F.2d at 1356-57. The court did not explain the
different treatment it gave the two situations. Indeed, the court indicated that the reasons for al-
lowing a defendant to raise the violation is even more compelling in abduction than in specialty
cases. See id. at 1356. There is no apparent logical reason for requiring a protest in one situation
while not requiring it in another.
93. Larry Rohter, Mexico Arrests Six in Abduction Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1990, at A9.
94. United States v. Alvarez-Machan, 946 F.2d 1466, 1467 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 60
U.S.L.W. 3376 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1992) (No. 91-712).
95. See id.
96. Verdugo II, 939 F.2d at 1343.
Vol. 41:907]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:907
to the granting of the appropriate judicial relief."97 Accepted practice
holds that if a state wishes repatriation of a suspect abducted from its
territory, it must explicitly demand his return. 98 If Mexico had intended
that the protest in Verdugo II be taken as an attempt to "lay the founda-
tion" for a judicial determination that jurisdiction did not exist, then the
government could have explicitly demanded Verdugo-Urquidez's return.
Mexico clearly knew how to do so, as shown by the protest in Alvarez-
Machain's case. Judge Browning partially dissented in Verdugo II be-
cause of the vast difference in the Mexican response to the two abduc-
tions, noting that the difference in the two protests "is striking and may
well be significant." 99 Judge Browning's dissent correctly emphasized
the difficulty of attempting to divine the true meaning of a foreign state's
ambiguous protest. The Verdugo II court's requirement of a protest in
the case of a kidnapping (while inexplicably not requiring one in a spe-
cialty case) is not workable. Many diplomatic and domestic political rea-
sons may account for a particular method of protest. 10°
97. Id at 1360. The court failed to explain how the Mexican government would have surmised
that the court would in fact require such a protest, given that no other court had ever found that an
abduction had violated an extradition treaty. See supra note 91.
98. RFSrATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 432 cmt. c (1987) ("[IThe state from which the person was abducted may demand return of the
person and international law requires that he be returned. If the state... does not demand his
return, under the prevailing view the abducting state may proceed to prosecute him under its laws.")
(emphasis added); idL reporter's note 3 ("[S]tates ordinarily refrain from trying persons illegally
brought from another state only if that state demands the person's return.") (emphasis added).
99. Verdugo II, 939 F.2d at 1368 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
majority in Verdugo II disagreed with Judge Browning's partial dissent, which he based upon the
language of the Restatement, claiming:
[WMhat the authors of the Restatement mean by "demand his return" is far different from
what Judge Browning suggests. The Reporter's Note... uses as illustrations of what is
required the cases of individuals who were returned on the basis of a simple "protest," and
not of an express unequivocal repatriation "demand" by the government of the offended
nation.
Id at 1360-61 n.22. The majority is incorrect. Although the Reporter's Note first used the word
"demand" and then immediately stated that "[iln a number of cases, protest by the offended state
resulted in the release or return of the accused person," RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 432 reporter's note 3 (1987) (emphasis added), both of
the referenced cases were, in fact, actually cases of an explicit repatriation demand, not a mere
protest. See Lawrence Preuss, Note, Kidnaping of Fugitives from Justice on Foreign Territory, 29
AM. J. INT'L L. 502, 503 (1935) (In the Jacob case, "[t]he Swiss government, therefore demanded
the immediate return of Jacob, the punishment of the guilty functionaries, and the taking of steps
necessary to prevent the recurrence of like incidents."); Note of the Federal Council to the German
Foreign Office, Apr. 1, 1935, reprinted in JOURNAL DE GENIVE, Apr. 3, 1935; Swiss Make Issue of
Nazi Kidnapping, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1935, at I; see also Casablanca Case (Fr. v. Get.), 1 Hague
Ct. Rep. (Scott) 110, 110 (1909).
100. See, eg., Row over DEA Snatch Caper; Doctor Abducted and Flown to Stand Trial in the
US., LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., May 3, 1990, at 4 ("Mexico's efforts [in the Alvarez case] seem
directed more towards finding those responsible for the snatch than towards getting the physician
back.").
EXTRA TERRITORIAL ABDUCTION
By finding that all that is needed to void jurisdiction is a protest of
the nature of that filed in Verdugo-Urquidez's case, the court placed the
asylum state in a dilemma. In light of the Verdugo II holding, the asy-
lum state has three choices: 1) clearly protest a violation of its sover-
eignty and demand repatriation, thereby voiding U.S. jurisdiction and
being forced to take back the suspect; 2) ignore the violation altogether;
or 3) protest ambiguously and allow the U.S. courts to decide what was
meant. The contrast between the Mexican government's responses to the
Alvarez-Machain and Verdugo-Urquidez abductions lends credence to
the U.S. government's view that Mexico intended the letters to lead to a
diplomatic resolution of the Verdugo-Urquidez matter.101 The court
should have adopted Judge Browning's view that any protest must
clearly demand the return of the suspect to void the court's jurisdiction.
This would permit the full range of diplomatic remedies, discussed in
Part IV, while preserving the versatility states need to respond to chang-
ing circumstances.
IV. REMEDIES
By finding that Mexico's protest in Verdugo's case was sufficient to
strip the court of jurisdiction, the Verdugo I court removed the flexibil-
ity that governments need to manage the diplomatic effects of an irregu-
lar rendition. By forcing the offended state to choose between not
protesting at all and taking back the suspect, the court ignored the alter-
native remedies already available to the state and to the individual. A
repatriation remedy elevates the process over the result intended by the
parties. As noted previously, the extradition treaty is designed to pro-
mote efficiency in the administration of justice, not to permit criminals to
escape by finding a safe haven in another country. 10 2
The repatriation remedy is not only inconsistent with the goals of
extradition treaties, but is also inconsistent with Supreme Court doctrine
with regard to illegal arrests. The Court has definitively rejected the idea
that a defendant's body is a suppressible "fruit of the poisonous tree."
Two recent cases, United States v. Crews 10 3 and INS v. Lopez-Men-
doza '04 specifically rejected any possibility that such a claim survived
Ker and Frisbie, concluding that "[tihe 'body' ... of a defendant... is
never itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest."'105 The Verdugo
101. See Verdugo I, 939 F.2d at 1360.
102. See supra Part H1(A).
103. 445 U.S. 463 (1979).
104. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
105. Id. at 1039; see also Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 263 (7th Cir. 1990)
("While we do not condone government misconduct such as Matta alleges, we cannot create an
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11 court relegated Lopez-Mendoza and Crews to a footnote and distin-
guished them on the grounds that their holdings were not applicable to a
violation of a treaty, but only to a violation of the U.S. Constitution. 10 6
In so doing, the court apparently elevated treaty law above the U.S. Con-
stitution: "[E]xtradition treaties set forth mandatory procedures that
must be followed .... Therefore, failure to comply with an extradition
treaty affects the jurisdiction of the court in a way that a typical illegal
arrest-even if in violation of the Constitution-does not."'10 7
There are more appropriate remedies available if an abduction is
held to be illegal, all of which are well-established. The most obvious
alternative remedy is for the states to deal with the problem on the diplo-
matic level, where such disputes have traditionally been resolved. The
abducting state can be pressured into issuing an apology to the offended
state, as done in the case of the abduction of Adolph Eichmann from
Argentina by Israel. s08 Another remedy, explicitly recognized by the
Supreme Court in Ker, is for the abducted fugitive to sue his abductors in
U.S. courts.109
A more serious remedy, and one that could act as a strong deterrent
to a policy of abduction, is for the offended state to demand that the
United States extradite the kidnappers to stand trial on charges of kid-
napping.110 In fact, Mexico did exactly that in the Alvarez-Machain
matter.I1  A refusal to extradite the kidnappers might jeopardize inter-
national cooperation in a variety of areas." 2
exclusionary rule for the person of the defendant ... in the face of repeated affirmation by the
Supreme Court that no such rule exists.").
106. See Verdugo II, 939 F.2d at 1347 n.7. The court dismissed several other cases in the same
manner.
107. Id
108. See U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 868th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960). After "private
bounty hunters" kidnapped Eichmann, a Nazi war criminal, from Argentina, a flurry of diplomatic
activity resulted. Argentina protested to the U.N. Security Council, which condemned the abduc-
tion. Israel subsequently apologized for the incident, and the matter was declared closed; Argentina
never demanded Eichmann's repatriation.
109. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886); see also Extraterritorial Apprehension by the
Federal Bureau ofInvestigation, 4Q Op. Off. Legal Counsel 543, 554-55 (1980) (noting the potential
civil liability of federal officials for false imprisonment, false arrest, and assault and battery).
110. See Seizure Hearing, supra note 8, at 25 (statement of Abraham D. Sofaer); see also Ker,
119 U.S. at 444 (noting that treaty with Peru provided for extradition of persons charged with
kidnapping).
111. Mexico Wants U.S. to Extradite Pair, CHi. TRIB., July 22, 1990, at 16.
112. See, eg.. Rohter, supra note 93 (reporting that Mexico threatened to suspend cooperation
in efforts to halt drug trafficking).
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If the rule in Verdugo II and Alvarez stands, fugitives abroad need
not fear being brought to justice, especially where the asylum state for-
bids extradition of nationals. As DEA Administrator Robert Bonner as-
serted, "[t]he implications of the [Alvarez] case are that anyone who can
get a foreign government to issue a note of protest may have a ticket out
of prosecution, conviction and sentencing in the United States."' 13 The
decisions import into U.S. law a provision of foreign law giving de facto
immunity to nationals, which the United States condemns, directly in
conflict with the Court's admonition in Ker that "it is idle.., to claim
that, either by express terms or by implication, there is given to a fugitive
... any right to remain and reside in the [asylum state]."114 The Crews
Court indicated that, in determining the impact of an illegal arrest, a
balance must be struck between the administration of justice and the con-
stitutional rights of individuals:
Our numerous precedents ordering the exclusion of such illegally ob-
tained evidence assume implicitly that the remedy does not extend to
barring the prosecution altogether. So drastic a step might advance
marginally some of the ends served by exclusionary rules, but it would
also increase to an intolerable degree interference with the public inter-
est in having the guilty brought to book.115
The Verdugo II court ignored this balance. The court's repatriation rem-
edy seriously interferes with the public interest in trying people suspected
of committing serious crimes.
V. CONCLUSION
In cases of terrorism and other politically sensitive international
crimes, governments should not be unnecessarily hampered in their pur-
suit of the essential goal of all criminal law- to punish the guilty. The
decision to request extradition according to the treaty procedures or to
pursue a different method of acquiring custody is a decision that the ex-
ecutive must make after weighing the seriousness of the crime, the likeli-
hood of a formal extradition, and the interest of the United States in
punishing the guilty.'1 6 Successful trial and conviction is the only possi-
ble way to discourage such crimes, especially when those crimes are part
113. Philip Shenon, Drug Chief Defends Abduction of Mexican Doctor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29,
1990, at 18 (quoting Bonner).
114. Ker, 119 U.S. at 442.
115. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 n.20 (citation omitted).
116. See Seizure Hearing, supra note 8, at 8 (statement of William Barr). The question is un-
doubtedly fraught with the danger of severe repercussions abroad. The U.S. embassy in Honduras
was the site of riots for days following the abduction of Matta-Ballesteros, even in the absence of a
protest by the Honduran government. See Popular Response, LATIN Am. WKLY. REP., Apr. 21,
1988, at 4. Matta-Ballesteros unsuccessfully sought to use this "protest by the people" as equivalent
to a protest by the government, in order to raise the same defense as Verdugo-Urquidez and Alvarez-
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of the foreign policy of some foreign states. A society has the inherent
right of self-defense.1 17 When crimes strike at a society's foundations,
the society must be able to fight back. Once they are captured, the sus-
pects will have all the protections of the Due Process Clause.1 ,
The diplomatic and other drawbacks of a "catch and snatch" policy
are sufficient to inhibit the use of such tactics except in the most extreme
cases; forcing repatriation of fugitives who would otherwise go unpun-
ished for their crimes goes too far. 1 9 The Supreme Court should reverse
the Ninth Circuit's holdings in Alvarez and Verdugo II, and hold that an
abduction does not violate an extradition treaty so as to strip the courts
of jurisdiction to hear legitimate criminal cases.
Machain. See Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 259-60 (7th Cir. 1990). In addition, the
Iranian Parliament passed a law authorizing its police to abduct Americans abroad shortly after the
Justice Department issued its 1988 opinion. See Iran Bill Allows Arrest of Americans 9%o Offend
Nation, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1989, at A7.
117. U.N. CHARTER art. 52.
118. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez (Verdugo 1), 494 U.S. 259 (1991). In light of the
Court's holding in Verdugo I that the extent of an alien's protection under the Constitution depends
on the link between him and the American society, that should be the extent of courts' concern.
119. Cf INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (" 'There comes a point at which
courts, consistent with their duty to administer the law, cannot continue to create barriers to law
enforcement in the pursuit of a supervisory role that is properly the duty of the Executive and
Legislative Branches.' That point has been reached here.") (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433, 459 (1976)).
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